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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the development of a neuroeconomic model of decision-making (DM). The 
method used was a review of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of game trials on economic 
choice. Key centers in economic DM are Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex, Frontopolar Cortex, Orbitofrontal Cortex, Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Amygdala and Ventral 
Tegmentum. The interaction of these centers determines individual risk-preference (NeM). The validity 
of NeM is consolidated by lesion-studies. NeM shows that relaxation exercises are complementary 
to physical fitness in the maintenance of mental health. Further, NeM explains the effect of “Early 
home-supported discharge” and how chess games support the learning of mathematics.
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1. INTRoDUCTIoN
In 1955, Herbert Simon introduced the neoclassical paradigm of bounded (or imperfect) rationality 
(BR) in economic decision-making (DM). Simon realized that in practical life, rational decisions 
are limited by 1) insufficient information, 2) insufficient personal skills, and 3) shortage of time. 
Today, BR is challenged by economic psychology as introduced by (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979). 
Neuroeconomics is a new transdisciplinary field of neuroscience, behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology developed around new hypersensitive brain scanners as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). Early reviews were focused on how neuroscience could inform economics (Camerer 
et al., 2005), neuroeconomic research from the economics point of view (Kenning and Plassman, 
2005), specific neurocenters relevant to economic decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2006), and 
social decision-making (Sanfey, 2008). A recent neuroeconomic review identifies integration of reward 
seeking (RSS) and cognitive executive control (ES) as crucial to economic DM (Farb, 2013). RSS is 
a mesolimbic dopamine system originating in Striatum, passing the Midbrain and Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex (ACC) towards Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC). ES is centered in Dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) and 
is served by the Frontopolar Cortex (FPC) as well as posterior cortices as the visuospatial sketchpad 
in Intraparietal Sulcus (IPS) and semantic memories in Superior Temporal Sulcus.
A neuroreview assesses the schism between BR and cognitive psychology from the economics 
point of view (Camerer, 2008): Most economists think that neural evidence is unnecessary holding BR 
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as the central normative position. Other economists share the skepticism among cognitive psychologists 
and neuroscientists about how rapidly new techniques like fMRI will yield operational conclusions. 
Some economists do have a cautious optimism about the option value of neuroeconomics. Addressing 
this cautious optimism, the present study aims to synthesize BR and psychological coping developing 
a neuroeconomic model of DM.
2. MATERIALS AND METHoD
Neuroeconomics is not yet a medical search term (MESH) in PubMed. Searching for “Neurueconomics, 
decision making and fMRI” finds 63 studies, out of which only Sanfey et al. (2003) is a primary trial 
on an economic choice. However, the reviews cited above, reference other relevant trials (registered 
in PubMed) as listed in Table 1.
The following seven neurocenters are extracted from Table 1 for construction of a Neuroeconomic 
model in Section 3:
1) vmPFC, 2) dlPFC, 3) FPC, 4) OFC, 5) ACC, 6) Am and 7) VT\
Table 1. Primary fMRI-trials on economic choice
Author Purpose Method Center
Sanfey/Rilling 
(2003)
The neural base of 
emotional and cognitive 
processes in economic 
choice
fMRI of ultimatum game (UG) distributing a 
monetary reward dlPFC and ACC
McLure et al. 
(2004)
The neural base of 
Intertemporal choices (IC)
fMRI of participants offered a choice between 
rewards at different points of time
ACC, Am1 and 
dlPFC
Daw et al. (2006)
The neural base of 
switching: explorative 
vs. exploitative economic 
choices
fMRI of healthy subjects performing a ‘four-
armed bandit’ task involving repeated choices 
between 4 slot machines
FPC-IPS or 
dlPFC
Goel et al. (2006)
The role of Prefrontal 
Hemispheric specialization 
in problem solving
Inference tasks were administered to 4 groups: 
Subjects dominated by the left PFC (dlPFC) 
with/-out brain injury and 2 other groups 
dominated by right PFC (FPC) with/-out injury
Dominance of 
dlPFC
Li et al. 2017 Neural correlates to cognitive Error
fMRI of 143 subjects performing a gain/loss 
framing task with data from >8000 studies
dlPFC and 
Amygdala (Am)
Erk et al. (2002) Neural base of symbols (cars) of wealth/dominance
fMRI of differential responses viewing 
photographs of limousines, sports cars and 
small cars
Ventral 
Tegmentum 
(VT)
Singer (2006) The neural base of empathy Review of PET and fMRI-studies of ‘Mind Reading’ respective empathy ACC
Camille et al. 
(2004) The neural base of regret
fMRI manipulating a simple gambling task 
on ‘counterfactual thinking’ to subjects with 
normal respective injured Orbitofrontal Cortex
OFC
Levy/Glimcher 
(2012)
The neural base of 
valuation system
Meta-analysis of 13 fMRI-studies of monetary 
reward choices vmPFC - OFC
Hare et al. (2014) Rationality of DM in IC fMRI of ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) respective dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) in IC
vmPFC and 
dlPFC
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3. RESULTS
3.1. fMRI Studies of General Economic Choice
1.  Economic DM is investigated in the Ultimatum Game (UG), where one person offers another 
person a prize, e.g. 100 EURO, if he agrees with a third person on the sharing of this prize 
(Sanfey and Rilling, 2004). The UG is an economic choice because it (1) involves preferences 
for a reward and (2) requires cognitive reasoning on the best decision within a budget restriction 
(100 EURO). The UG is reproduced a number of times, showing that dlPFC (ES) and ACC/Insula 
(RSS) are activated simultaneously: ACC/Insula dichotomizes the transmission of signals towards 
the Frontal Cortex: emotions transmit to the OFC and saliency signals to dlPFC (Mohanty et al., 
2007). In broad terms, this confirms the classical Homo Economicus optimizing the combination 
of preferences (formed in RSS) with budget restrictions (worked out by ES) (Pareto, 1906). A 
meta-analysis of 37 studies of UG find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the 
responder (Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Offers below 20% are mostly rejected and in all 16% of the 
offers are rejected;
2.  Intertemporal Choice (IC) offers a group of persons a choice between rewards at different 
points of time. IC has a rational choice as that in accordance with the borrowing rate in 
the financial system. Respondents to IC divide in a group of rationalists dominated by 
dlPFC and a subgroup of risk-averters preferring a halving of their reward as paid instantly 
instead of waiting a year (McClure et al., 2004). The risk-averters are identified by Am 
indicating hyper activation of the fear network also comprising ACC/Insula and OFC. 
Despite methodological shortcomings in the study of intertemporal choice, evidence 
exists in favor of a two-component (Quasi-Hyperbolic) model of intertemporal choice 
referring to the subsystems centering, respectively, dlPFC and Am. A later fMRI-study 
of prosocial DM finds an analogue subgrouping of participants: one group with strong 
cognitive control dominated by dlPFC and another group of group-oriented subjects 
dominated by the fear network centering Am (Declerck et al. 2013; Fermin et al. 2016). 
Over-activation of Am is associated with the serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) in a 
meta-analysis (Munafo etal., 2008). Over-activation of Am constitutes Social Anxiety 
Disorder (Bruhl et al., 2014) wherefore the border between a normal risk-aversion and 
Social Anxiety Disorder is a gray zone;
3.  A game trial within the field of reinforcement learning investigates a switch between normal 
exploitative choices and extraordinary explorative choices9. The subjects performed a ‘four-
armed bandit’ task involving repeated choices between four slot machines paying out points (to 
be exchanged for money) around four different means randomly and independently changing 
from trial to trial. Exploration appears when subjects choose another slot than the one with the 
highest expected mean (the subjective experience behind these choices were described during 
a post-task interview). The simultaneous fMRI documents increased activity in Frontopolar 
Cortex (FPC) and IPS (centering the visuospatial sketchpad) during explorative choices (Daw et 
al., 2006). Further, FPC differentiates entrepreneurs managing their own venture from managers 
without venture experience in a controlled, non-randomized trial (Laurie-Martinez et al., 2014). 
Managing entrepreneurs made more efficient decisions than non-entrepreneur management. In 
summary, complementarity exists within ES between sequencing by dlPFC (Robertson et al., 
2007) and association by FPC (Green et al. 2006; Bochin and Buckley 2015; Ryals et al., 2016);
4.  A study (MRI) examines hemispheric specialization and DM during conditions of resolving 
certain, respective uncertain inferences (Goel et al., 2006). The results provide compelling 
evidence for hemispheric specialization for reasoning in PFC where the right PFC has a critical 
role to play about incompletely specified situations (ambiguity) which is typical to economic 
DM. This role involves the maintenance of ambiguous mental representations that temper 
premature over-interpretation by the left hemisphere. This special fallacy of left hemispheric 
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(dlPFC) dominance is explained as an over-imposed goal-direction blocking interhemispheric 
communication due to serial processing (with limited capacity) in the left lateral FPC (Koechlin 
and Hyafil, 2007). This cognitive fallacy is shown to appear far more frequent than fear-related 
biases (Li et al., 2017);
5.  Classical economic man is a sovereign decision-maker as prototyped by Robinson Crusoe. BR 
does not change this pattern as his adaption of social attitudes in institutional settings is explained 
as individualist career moves. More studies contradict sovereign individual economic choices:
a.  The promotion effect on consumer goods of associated status symbols e.g. athletes are well-
known in marketing. The extra cognition by neuroeconomics is to specify VT in the basal 
pro-reptile brain as dominant in this influence (Erk et al., 2002);
b.  Empathy and solidarity originate at the pro-mammal brain level (ACC). These qualities rely 
on a “mirror”-function meaning that our response to the pain of other people is nearly as 
strong as to pain originated in our own body (Singer, 2007);
c.  Regret as a technical term for conscientiousness is rooted in OFC at the Neomammal brain 
level (Camille and Corricello, 2004).
3.2. A Neuroeconomic Model
Koechlin and Hyafil (2007) has simulated the higher center of reintegration of RSS (VT, ACC, Am, 
OFC and FPC) and ES (dlPFC and FPC) in a neurocomputational model, where FPC as overlapping 
center sets our top-goal (or top-reward) in a pending, top-down relationship with vmPFC activating 
dlPFC (Oya et al, 2007). Basically, vmPFC inhibits OFC enabling graduation of reward-seeking as 
a bottom-up mechanism of integration (Beer et al., 2007). Levy and Glimcher (2013) identifies the 
vmPFC-OFC-complex as a value system constantly updating the expected utility. The integration 
process is illustrated in Figure 1.
The intrinsic imbibition of RSS is reflected by Am as the X-axis. For simplicity Am is indicated 
by the variability of the heart rate (HRV) (Thayer et al., 2012). The intrinsic state of ES – the balance 
of associations (FPC) and sequencing (dlPFC) – is indicated by the intensity of lateralized cortical 
control in the prefrontal EEG (Papousek and Schulter, 2002). The basic relationship between RSS 
Figure 1. Neuroeconomic model of decision-making (NeM)
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and ES is substitutional in economic terms or antagonistic in neurological terms: Arousal arising 
from RSS (Thalamus) is inversely related to Frontal attention by vmPFC (Portas et al. 1998; Olbrich 
et al. 2009). The minimal prediction error - or “Optimum” - is in such concave substitution relation 
the point where the first derivative has the value -1. The dominance of Am is characterized by risk-
aversion (Bruhl et al., 2014) while the dominance of dlPFC implicates a risk-loving that threatens 
sound judgement (Goel et al., 2006). Gain/Loss-games show that decision-errors due to a dominance 
of dlPFC or goal-directed behavior are more frequent than errors due to risk-aversive behavior (Li et 
al., 2017). The case of optimization requires, that emotional control by vmPFC enabling a relative 
strengthening of dlPFC - indicated by the vertical shift from X0 to X1 - is sufficient to overcome an 
initial imbalance by economic reasoning.
The risk-preference (NeM) is operated as “Willingness to take risks in general” in a representative 
survey on ‘risk attitudes’ with 20,000 respondents (Dohmen et al., 2012). The survey demonstrates 
that a simple question on ‘General risk attitude’ to be answered on a scale from 0 through 10 has a 
fairly good explanation of individual performance. The coefficients of correlation (r) on important 
life domains are: 1) Car driving (r = 0.49), 2) Financial matters (r = 0.50), 3) Careers (r = 0.61), 4) 
Sports/leisure (r = 0.56), and 5) Health (r = 0.48).
A number of factors affect the ‘General risk attitude’, however, the single far most important 
factor is gender as females are much more risk-averse than males. Also, the wiring of the brain shows 
gender differences (Ingalhalifar, 2014). Figure 2 shows the distribution of ‘General risk attitude’ in the 
adult population (18+). The total distribution is right skewed due to a very strong right-skewedness 
of females’ ‘General risk attitude’, while nearly symmetrical around “Rationality” for males. The 
median of females’ ‘General risk attitude’ is a moderate risk-aversion level, where economic decisions 
are made communicating with other rather than strictly rational.
4. DISCUSSIoN
4.1. Validity of NeM as Decision-Making Model
NeM identifies brain regions that are evidenced to be active in core fMRI-experiments with economic 
choice. However, more brain regions have different functions in different contexts. In order to insure 
Figure 2. Social distribution of general risk-preference
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the reverse function, that the associated function appears when that identified region is active, lesion 
studies are relevant to complement interpretations of fMRI (Xue et al., 2010):
• Lesions in vmPFC reduce the consistency of DM in accordance with the assigned role as over-all 
center of cognitive integration (Camille and Griffith, 2011);
• A neurological review develops the classical concept from lesions in OFC (inhibitory control) into 
a role across reward domains in forming and “updating the expected value of specific outcomes” 
(Rudebeck and Murray, 2015);
• A study of patients with lesions in dlPFC provides key evidence for the necessity of dlPFC in 
the manipulation of verbal and spatial knowledge (Barbey et al., 2013);
• Using an animal model, localized lesions to the FPC of nonhuman primates selectively impair 
the ability of the animal to learn rapidly about novel objects and rules (Green et al., 2006);
• The ACC or pro-mammal Cortex is the root of emotions as pro-reptiles without a significant 
ACC are ruled by behavioral instincts according to McLean (Cory and Gardner (Eds), 2002);
• Subcortical nodes as Am and VT should not need further explanation as they are well-known 
to neurophysiology.
In-all, evidence exists on the reversal validity of all distributed center functions in NeM. The 
interaction of these centers constitutes a risk-preference function as presented in Figure 1. Moreover, 
the forward correlation from risk-preference to neural activity is investigated (Rudorf et al., 2012): 
Subjects were grouped into risk-averters and risk-seekers according to the risk preference they revealed 
in a simple lottery task. This fMRI-study confirms the main assumption of Figure 1 that the internal 
inhibition of RSS is strong in risk-averters and weak in risk-lovers.
4.2. Neuroeconomic Training
NeM establishes a 2-way relationship between mental phenomena and neural substrates. This opens a 
new window for ‘objective’ mental training in the sense that neural processes are targeted to improve 
subjective qualities. In this way, traditional problems of “transference” between coach and client may 
be avoided. Neuroeconomic training respects personal integrity as other positivist training which is 
of special relevance for use in user-driven healthcare.
4.2.1. Relaxation Exercise
The crucial question is what type of neural training is relevant to strengthen subjective DM? 
NeM identifies self-control or endurance by vmPFC as crucial to mental health (Hare et al., 
2014). The health effect of improved endurance by regular physical exercise is documented 
(Oaten and Cheng, 2006). Specific to emotional biases in DM risk-aversion builds up in the 
fear network centering Am. Moderate fear is conducive to cognition (Optimum), while strong 
emotional stress leads to maladaptation (Bruhl et al., 2014). Relaxing the fear network (Am) is 
hypothesized to facilitate cognition as illustrated by a horizontal shift in Figure 3. Already, a 
review with meta-analysis of the effectiveness of various relaxation techniques towards anxiety 
finds a significant effect (Manzoni et al., 2008). Despite severe male stress responses (Wang et 
al., 2007), the practice of relaxation exercises is very unequal distributed among genders. Yoga 
Asanas (physical relaxation techniques) are very popular among women in the industrialized 
world, but rare among men. Mental or logical relaxation in the format of meditation techniques is 
practiced only by a small minority – equally distributed on males and females - in the risk-loving 
part of the risk-preference spectrum (Hurk et al., 2011). Historically, the access to relaxation 
procedures as yoga and meditation are conditioned by some degree of belief which represents 
a strong barrier to rationalist males. Based on NeM, rationalist men may benefit from stress 
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management by complementary use of physical fitness and meditative relaxation independent 
of historical belief systems.
Promoting the status of alternative, user-driven relaxation exercises inspired by classical yoga and 
meditation to complementary healthcare implicates new challenges: What’s the best relaxation procedure? 
How should the dissemination of such complementary health interventions be organized? To what 
extent may modern biofeedback technology improve the effectiveness of classical relaxation techniques?
4.2.2. Chess Morals
Regarding moderation of uncontrolled risk-loving as general maturation problem for youngsters 
– the most frequent DM-error (Li et al., 2017) - appropriate means are less obvious. A line 
of research inspired by Benjamin Franklin (1779) focuses on chess training as this ancient 
game demands interaction of basic qualities of the brain as sequencing (dlPFC), exploration 
(FPC) and self-control (vmPFC). A review concludes that chess training has a moderate but 
significant positive effect on mathematical skills among children at the primary school level 
(Bart, 2014). According to the Danish Association of School Chess, now, 200+ studies exist 
of the effect of chess instruction in early primary school on concentration, learning, reading 
and mathematics. A study substituted a weekly lesson in mathematics with chess instruction 
in primary school grades 1-3. Looking at subgroups, significant positive effects were found 
for native children, but not for children of immigrants (Gumede and Rosholm, 2015).
Despite the promising beginning in the introduction of chess at an early stage of 
primary school, there is still much to do in the development of chess as a broad tool for 
decision-making training. For example, is it common among advanced chess players to use 
computer analysis of their games. Such programs are able to identify poor chess-decisions 
as “Misinterpretations” and “Overlookings”. So, in combination with cheap computer 
programs young chess players may gain crucial self-recognition on the subjective conditions 
of “Misinterpretations” and “Overlookings”.
Figure 3. Cognition by relaxation
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4.2.3. Early Home-Supported Discharge (EHSD)
When patients move from a hospital clinic to domicile their blood pressure declines 5-7 
mmHg (Verberk et al., 2005). Following NeM (Figure 3) such Limbic relaxation may 
empower the cognitive function in the same way as do relaxation exercises. Actually, home-
based rehabilitation is object to a number of research projects. Especially stroke patients 
have a large risk of severe disablement as nearly 30% may have poor outcome (PO) – dies 
or become disabled – by 6 months follow-up after admission. The Cochrain Trialists have 
reviewed a series of RCT on Early Home-supported Discharge (EHSD) as compared to 
usual care for patients suffering from stroke (Langhorne et al., 2005). The meta-analysis 
demonstrates a significant reduction in PO while traditional hospital measures as Barthél 
Index or Functional Independence Measure only show non-significant tendencies. In all, 
this indicates that the primary effect of EHSD is rather better psychological coping than 
somatic training as hypothesized from NeM.
Further, integrated programs of physical exercise and cognitive relaxation (meditation) may 
together benefit cardiac patients. An integrated mind/body approach to cardiac rehabilitation studied 
during a 3-month program 637 patients with coronary artery disease. As an outcome, this program 
gave a significant improvement for patients considered to be at “higher risk” level for cardiac events 
(Casey et al., 2009).
4.3. Related Models of Decision-Making
NeM as illustrated in Figure 1 is essentially a neural rooting of the vision of classical Homo Economicus 
(Pareto, 1906) as operated in the Neoclassical paradigm (BR) (Simon, 1955). In summary, NeM 
consolidates in one side BR as the central theorem of behavioral economics (Simon, 1955). On 
the other side are the borders of BR identified - not just as “Gray Zones” – but as different value-
systems: Group-oriented risk-averters bordering anxiety disorders respective Risk-lovers challenging 
conventional wisdom. Related models of DM as advanced by applied psychology respective 
neurobiology are discussed below.
4.3.1. NeM and Behavioral Psychology
Luo and Yu (2015) models human choice as integration of emotion and cognition. In the 
typical case, the outcome is rational choices. “Reduced Cognition” is associated with strong 
fear (Am). When emotions are out of cognitive control, a state of “Exaggerated Emotions” 
appears ruled by intuition. The state of “Exaggerated Emotions” should not be confounded with 
the state of “Risk-loving” in NeM. Risk-lovers are characterized by low emotional inhibition 
and relative strong cognitive function. As such, Risk-lovers are a subgroup of persons with 
“Exaggerated Emotions”.
Luo and Yu (2015) propose emotion regulation by cognitive measures (dlPFC) as attention 
deployment, cognitive change and response modulation to stabilize “Exaggerated Emotions”. 
In comparison, NeM proposes improved mental health by user-driven neurophysiological 
measures as physical fitness, relaxation exercise, diet and understanding of NeM to persons 
with a normal mental health.
4.3.2. NeM and the Neurobiological Model
Ernst et al. (2006) propose a triadic model of the neurobiology of motivated behavior in adolescence. 
In this model vmPFC centers cognitive integration parallel to NeM. Further, Am serves the intralimbic 
inhibition parallel to NeM. However, Nucleus Accumbens (NAc) represents - as the third pillar - an 
intralimbic counter pole to Am. A subsequent study of animal behavior identifies the NAc core as 
crucial to the association of a cue stimuli with another reward, than the specific one in Paulovian-
instrumental Transfer (General PIT). At the level of goal-directed human behavior. The authors 
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hypothesize that complacency is a general PIT-fallacy explaining the cognitive error identified by 
Goel et al. (2006).
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